Horribly Annoying Music; Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter

In restaurants, waiting rooms, dentist offices, airports, grocery stores, phone-hold, ad nauseam, we are bombarded persistently with music and television content, not of our own choosing.  This is akin to someone forcing a book or other reading material three inches away from our face with the admonition “READ THIS”.

U. S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and I would have likely agreed fully with one another. While reading a recent The New Yorker magazine, my wife ran across a short comment about Justice Frankfurter having recused [removed] himself from the following 1952 case.  Click here for a link to the supreme court opinion in Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

What triggered my interest was Justice Frankfurter’s spot-on reaction to this 1952 case, that I include further below. This 1952 anecdote also gives me pause (without my further comment) to ponder where Supreme Court justices (and potential justices) fall now in 2018 as to the notion that a Supreme Court justice lays aside private views in discharging his or her judicial function.

The issue in this 1952 Supreme Court case dealt with some Washington DC public transportation passengers who asserted their constitutional rights were violated by having to listen to streetcar, bus, and railway piped-in music, announcements and advertisements. This content consisted generally of 90% music, 5% announcements, and 5% commercial advertising. The Supreme Court did not side with these constitutional objections.

And, Justice Frankfurter had such a strong reaction (and opposition) to this forced audio content, that he recused himself from the case with the following comment (which is in the published Supreme Court opinion) [I added the underlining below]:

Justice Frankfurter:

The judicial process demands that a judge move within the framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that, on the whole, judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted. But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in judgment. They do this for a variety of reasons. The guiding consideration is that the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested, as well as be so in fact.

 

This case for me presents such a situation. My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it. I am explicit as to the reason for my nonparticipation in this case because I have for some time been of the view that it is desirable to state why one takes himself out of a case.

 

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