I published a very good primer on directed trusts last week for Leimberg Information Services. Click here for a copy of the primer. You are welcome to reprint or email this pdf primer for other readers. For many of you I believe my discussion about using a directed trustee for investment management is important, and can greatly help prevent Madoff scams. Please contact me if you have any questions: email@example.com
This is my second blog post dealing with the increasing Brave New World of “digital assets” and how these assets fit with a person’s estate planning. Below are a few of my brief comments about cryptocurrency:
(1) In the cryptocurrency world, a person’s “private key” is the crucial element separating access to one’s cryptocurrency and its loss (likely permanent). The private key is analogous to a password. My strong point here is to keep a backup of your private key, and let trusted family members know where they can find your private key in the event you are unable to provide it (your death, disability, etc.). There are hundreds of web references to individuals having permanently lost millions of dollars in cryptocurrency due to lost private keys. Click here for an example from Wired magazine referring to a CEO who recently died; and no one can find his private key to an estimated $137 million in cryptocurrency;
(2) The above access / backup problem is particularly elusive, and difficult, as many cryptocurrency users are extremely private about this subject, often to the intentional exclusion of their family members, etc.;
(3) As a related aside, the IRS, no doubt, is interested in your cryptocurrency. IRS Notice 2014-21 is its first published guidance in the form of answers to frequently asked questions. Click here to read this notice;
(4) The above IRS Notice includes a great deal of information. Two points likely a surprise to most readers are: (i) the IRS is treating cryptocurrency transactions for income tax purposes as a “sale or exchange”. For example, if you use $50,000 of cryptocurrency to purchase an item; you will trigger gain or loss on the $50,000 depending on your cost basis in your cryptocurrency, etc. I purposely do not include more detail about this gain / loss treatment for this post; and (ii) Notice 2014-21 expressly states the IRS will treat cryptocurrency as property, not as currency. For estate tax planning purposes, this means cryptocurrency will be inludable in the owner’s estate at death, with a stepped-up (or stepped-down) cost basis based on the cryptocurrency FMV at the person’s death;
(5) Finally, I strongly recommend an express provision dealing with crypocurrency be included in a person’s estate planning documents (trustee, executor, power of attorney powers, etc.). Below is my current draft of possible language for dealing with cryptocurreny (again, this is merely my example language for this post; no reader may rely on this provision as legal or any other advice from me or my law firm):
“To handle on my behalf any of my digital asset “cryptocurrency“, defined for purposes of this DPOA [durable power of attorney] as digital assets that are exchanged electronically and based on a decentralized network or exchange, with such exchanges not requiring a reliable intermediary and managed using distributed ledger technology. In broad terms I give my agent under this DPOA the power to accept or pay on my behalf any cryptocurrency, digital asset currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person to another person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means. The above term “other value that substitutes for currency” encompasses situations in which the transmission does not involve the payment or receipt of cryptocurrency, but does include, but is not limited to, my private and public keys, blockchain and ledger information, bitcoins, bitcoin addresses, and any other cryptocurrency user or account data or information related to such transactions or to any convertible currency related thereto on my behalf. My intent also is that my reference to “cryptocurrency” under this paragraph be read together as broadly as possible in the broad context of my reference to electronic communications content and the definition of “digital assets” under O.C.G.A. Section 53-13-2 (as amended) included in paragraph (gg) below;”
This anti-SLAPP blog post should be an item you keep on your litigation check-list in the event you are a defendant in a lawsuit. If anti-SLAPP applies, it can significantly short-circuit and give you an early-end to the litigation in your favor, stop costly discovery, and put you in a strong position to obtain attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation from the person who sued you. “SLAPP” stands for “strategic litigation against public policy.” A number of states, including Georgia, have anti-SLAPP laws that provide the above relief to defendants in certain situations.
Two days ago, June 24, 2019, the Georgia Supreme Court issued an opinion for the first time that deals with Georgia’s 2016 broad revision of its anti-SLAPP statutes under O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-11.1. The case is Wilkes & McHugh, et al. v. LTC Consulting, L.P. et al., No. S19A0146 (Ga. June 24, 2019). Click here for this opinion, which also has an excellent discussion by the Georgia Supreme Court setting forth the history and operation of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statutes (and Georgia cases prior to the 2016 change in these statutes).
This is part one of three blog posts I will provide on this anti-SLAPP topic.
A 15-second short summary of anti-SLAPP is that if you are in litigation that enables you to file a defensive anti-SLAPP motion, the person suing you (the plaintiff) has to convince the court in response to your anti-SLAPP motion that the plaintiff’s lawsuit claims against you (his or her Complaint) are both (i) legally sufficient and (ii) supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Now, for a slightly longer introductory summary. Another substantial benefit of you filing an anti-SLAPP motion is that all discovery and pending hearings or motions in your lawsuit are stopped (“stayed” in lawyer jargon). And, the court generally is required to conduct a hearing on your anti-SLAPP motion within 30 days after you file it.
The above June 24 Georgia Supreme Court opinion, in its opening paragraph, states the 2016 revision of the Georgia anti-SLAPP statutes substantially mirrors California’s anti-SLAPP statutes. Wilkes & McHugh at 1. In expressly acknowledging that California has developed a considerable body of case law interpreting its anti-SLAPP statutes, the Georgia Supreme Court states that it may look to California case law for interpreting the Georgia anti-SLAPP statutes. Id. at 15. [I have experience with the California anti-SLAPP statutes and their litigation application.]
For this first blog post on Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statutes, I purposely do not get into the weeds on the details as to what these laws are and how they apply procedurally in litigation. However, a threshold point in any potential anti-SLAPP situation is to determine whether you, as a defendant, can take advantage of these favorable provisions. The general rule, and I state this broadly, is that the lawsuit you are facing must involve the plaintiff’s claims against you that arise from facts or actions stemming from your constitutional right of “free speech” or “petition”. I will address these two elements in my next blog post.
My other key take-away points here are:
- The above two free-speech / petition categories as to when you might be able to get the benefit of anti-SLAPP are much broader than one might initially think. Existing California case law is replete with numerous issues that fall within these favorable anti-SLAPP free speech and petition requirements; and
- The California courts have effectively seen-through efforts by plaintiffs who, with artful drafting of a plaintiff’s Complaint, attempt to evade the reach of anti-SLAPP provisions by including mixed, unprotected non-SLAPP assertions in their Complaint to try and derail an anti-SLAPP challenge. See, for example, Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016). I assume this drafting scrutiny will be an important focus the Georgia Supreme Court will follow as more of these anti-SLAPP cases make their way through the Georgia courts.
Georgia is the first state in the nation to enact sweeping UDTA trust law changes, centering primarily on “directed trusts”, with these changes effective July 1, 2018 (I refer again to “UDTA” at the end of this post). These new laws are under O.C.G.A. Sections 53-12-500 thru 506. I will be providing brief posts in the near future about certain aspects of these changes. The “directed trust” is the current, progressive approach around the country for optimal trust planning.
The essence of what “directed trust” means is that the trustee of the trust, or even a named non-trustee advisor (called a “trust director” under the new Georgia law), can direct others — who each then become “directed trustees” — to handle certain aspects of the operation of the trust. For example, the trustee can direct an investment trustee to handle the investment management of the trust assets. Or, as another example, the trustee can direct an administrative trustee to handle the administration of the trust.
In other words, the trustee alone does not have to carry the burden and liability for all trust functions. This team approach using other directed trustees enables the trustee to carve up the trust responsibilities, sometimes referred to as à la carte trust administration.
Below are a handful of my initial, brief comments about directed trusts for this first blog post:
(1) I really like Georgia’s statutory endorsement of directed trusts. Especially facing inescapable, impending aging, we and our families need a team approach for the care, protection, and oversight of our assets and affairs. I am not a fan of empowering only one individual to handle all of these matters, even if that one-person is a family member. There needs to be team input, and corresponding checks and balances where the team members each have a more independent view of the team’s efforts. And, certainly in some cases, a trusted family member can be the trustee with the power to put in place these other directed trustees;
(2) My general take on these new Georgia directed trust laws is that each team member (that is, each directed trustee) is subject to a fiduciary standard and liable for breach of trust if committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the interests of the trust beneficiaries [see, e.g., Georgia O.C.G.A. Section 53-12-303, captioned “Relief of liability”]. In other words, each directed trustee has to act with a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries. This enhances the protective benefit of the team approach;
(3) Elder financial abuse is skyrocketing. For this reason, I strongly recommend families presently develop a relationship with a trusted, competent investment advisor who can help oversee the family’s investment assets. And, as needed, that trusted investment advisor can be, or later become, the family’s directed investment trustee. This advisory oversight, coupled with the above fiduciary duty standard and the now-stricter FINRA rules that address the financial exploitation of seniors, helps provide another team-member set of eyes and ears alert to the threat of financial abuse and fraud, etc.;
(4) These new Georgia directed trust laws are modeled after UDTA (the “Uniform Directed Trust Act”). These new laws are very dense, and appear well-drafted and comprehensive. But, easy, quick, no-thought, simple reliance on uniform laws can blind the lawyer drafting the trust. Even with these progressive laws, there needs to be artful trust document drafting so as to take advantage of these directed trust provisions, but without leaving unintended gaps or ambiguities in the trust document that cause problems down the road. Of course, artful drafting has always been the case with virtually any trust document.
Back in 2016, I wrote a blog post, captioned “Deju Vu. The 1974 NIXON Subpoena”; Click here for my earlier post. This post today is merely to restate one of the most interesting, unanswered constitutional law questions that has remained in the forefront of my mind all these years after my earlier days at Emory Law School.
This is not a political blog post, but it does center on how a President can, or might, respond to subpoenas. Here is this question’s relationship to the 1974 Nixon subpoena.
In short, in 1974 special prosecutor Leon Jaworski, while conducting the Nixon Watergate investigation, obtained a subpoena ordering President Nixon to release certain tapes and papers as to meetings between Nixon and others who had been indicted by a grand jury. Nixon refused. The US Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, concluded Nixon could not rely on executive privilege as immunity from complying with the subpoena. The Supreme Court ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes in response to the subpoena. Nixon ultimately agreed to comply with the subpoena.
Here is the constitutional question we discussed (and that hooked me all these years) in my constitutional law school class in response to the Nixon Supreme Court opinion. That is, how would Jaworski’s subpoena have been enforced if Nixon had snubbed the Supreme Court and taken the position he did not have to comply with the subpoena?
Because Nixon’s own executive branch was (and is) the only enforcement branch of government, what would have happened if Nixon did not allow his executive branch to enforce the subpoena? Remember, the judicial and legislative branches have no enforcement capability. Also, you and I would likely be jailed quickly by the executive branch for our failure to comply with a court order. [Nixon ended up voluntarily complying with the subpoena, without anyone having to deal with its enforcement.]
So, would the military have stepped in to enforce the Nixon subpoena? Would we have seen military tanks in front of the White House? Would there be an attempted coup? Would there be vigilante enforcement, etc.? We simply have no answer.
The point of this blog post is to remind each of us of, and elevate, the sanctity and design of our US three-branch system of government. In my view, especially as a lawyer, this three-branch system is the only reason we have been able to maintain our breadth of freedoms and rights against the historical backdrop of disputes, crises, disagreements, differing political and social views, and so forth.
The crucial question, at present, of another potential subpoena stand-off should not focus only on the substance or information of what the subpoena is seeking, but rather on how does the subpoena and its compliance fit with the need of continuing the essential and crucial balance of our three-system government? My imponderable constitutional question still remains unanswered and untested. Let’s keep it that way.
This blog post is in response to a recent April 2019 California case dealing with disgruntled siblings and an “in terrorem” (or no-contest) clause in their late mother’s revocable trust document. I use the California case to make the following broader comments for this blog post and tie my comments to a Georgia point.
An in terrorem clause (no-contest clause) in a Will or trust document is to prevent beneficiaries from raising issues as to the Will or trust in order, in most cases, to try and increase their share. The provisions under Georgia law for no-contest clauses are under O.C.G.A. Section 53-4-68 (for Wills) and Section 53-12-22 (for trusts).
An example of a no-contest clause in a Will is:
“If any beneficiary, alone or along with any other person or persons, directly or indirectly, contests or initiates proceedings to contest this Will in any court with a challenge to its validity of all or any part of my Will or in any manner, attacks or seeks to impair or invalidate any of the provisions of my Will or prevent any provision of my Will from being carried out in accordance with its terms, that contesting beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeceased me and as a result shall forfeit his or her interest under this Will in its entirety with his or her forfeited share passing to my other children, per stripes, as though the contesting beneficiary and his or her descendants all predeceased me.”
This blog post is not for the purpose of an extensive discussion about the design and use of a no-contest clause. But, rather, it helps illustrate that no-contest clauses are not just simply boilerplate provisions that one can, or should, without careful thought merely cut-and-paste into a Will or trust.
Below are a couple broader comments as to no-contest clauses:
I start with reference to a recent 2019 California court opinion dealing with a no-contest clause. This case has an extremely interesting and surprising twist that one of the litigious sisters likely never expected, to her detriment. This case is Key v. Tyler, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 358 (April 19, 2019). Click here for a copy. The core facts are that three adult sisters are beneficiaries of their deceased parents’ 1999 family trust. The family trust essentially provides for an equal split among the three sisters after their parents’ deaths. As of January 2006, the family trust was worth over $72 million. Lawyer-sister Tyler was the trustee.
A 2007 amendment to the 1999 family trust surfaced after the mother’s 2011 death (the mother was the second parent to die). After their mother’s death, sister Key asserted that her lawyer-sister Tyler had unduly influenced their mother in 2007 to amend the 1999 family trust. The 2007 trust amendment was apparently orchestrated by Tyler and resulted in Tyler increasing her own trust share substantially in excess of her other two sisters (including Key). The 1999 family trust and 2007 amendment each included a no-contest clause.
Sister Key, after the mother’s death, filed a California court action and asserted the 2007 trust amendment was the result of undue influence over their mother by lawyer-sister Tyler . The California court agreed with sister Key, with the result that the 2007 trust amendment was essentially disregarded. Although this California opinion is rich with an abundance of procedural details, factors, concepts, and other elements in this sister- v.-sister litigation, I make only the following three comments stemming from this California case (my knowledge of the facts in this case are based solely on information in the court opinion):
One. This point centers on the 1999 family trust and the 2007 trust amendment, each having a no-contest clause. One might reasonably ask: With the trust document having a no-contest clause, how was sister Key (the non-lawyer sister) able to attack the 2007 trust amendment, without triggering the clause against herself (Key)?
The reason is that California law, as with some other states (but not Georgia), has an exception to the challenge to a Will or trust with a no-contest clause, if the person making the challenge can show probable cause at the time of filing the challenge, such as probable cause of undue influence, or mental incapacity, etc.
In other words, without probable cause a person cannot simply file a challenge to a no-contest clause Will or trust and hope during the discovery phase of the litigation to luck-up or stumble across evidence of undue influence, or mental incapacity, etc. Probable cause up front reduces fishing-game litigation. Absent probable cause, the person making the challenge to the Will or trust also risks losing, with the result of being penalized by the no-contest clause.
Two. This next move in this litigation by sister Key is what greatly sparked my interest in this California case. Here it is: After sister Key successfully challenged and obtained the set-aside of their mother’s 2007 trust amendment, Key then filed a petition to enforce — against her lawyer-sister Tyler — the no-contest clause as to the 1999 family trust. This is the backfire.
Here the reader might say “Wait a minute, it was sister Key who challenged the 2007 trust amendment. Lawyer-sister Tyler never asserted any challenge. So, why now is lawyer-sister Tyler facing loss of her inheritance based on her (Tyler’s) violation of the no-contest clause? “
There are two primary reasons. First, the California court concluded sister Key had sufficient probable cause of undue influence to file her challenge to the 2007 amendment, even with the no-contest clause. The probable cause exception under California law provided an exception for Key to the trust amendment’s no-contest clause. Second, and this is the part of the California court opinion that really grabs my interest. The court, in concluding sister Key can seek to enforce the no-contest clause against Tyler, states:
“By [lawyer-sister] Tyler obtaining the 2007 Amendment through undue influence and then defending that amendment in court, Tyler sought to ‘impair’ and ‘invalidate’ the provisions of the original Trust that the 2007 Amendment purported to replace. The No-Contest Clause therefore disinherits Tyler if it is enforceable against her.”
2019 Cal. App. LEXIS, *29.
I assume lawyer-sister Tyler was completely blindsided by now finding herself the subject of a possible no-contest clause violation, and never for a moment considered that her court fight as trustee to defend and uphold the 2007 trust amendment would (or could) be the basis of Tyler herself violating the no-contest clause. Tyler now stands to lose her share of the trust if the court ultimately concludes Tyler violated the no-contest clause [the court has not yet arrived at a conclusion].
Three. This final point ties my Georgia discussion to the above California case. Georgia does not have a probable cause exception that allows a beneficiary with probable cause to challenge a no-contest clause Will or trust. My view is that Georgia (and all other states) needs a probable cause exception. This is up to the legislature.
Here also is my concern, merely as an example, of there being no probable cause exception in Georgia. Assume a family friend, business associate, or even a lawyer, becomes a close friend of an elderly widow or widower. And that person persuades the elderly person to change his or her Will to include him or her as a substantial beneficiary (or gets the elderly person to add his or her church or other charitable institution as a substantial beneficiary). Assume also that person persuades the elderly person to include a strong, no-contest clause in their Will or trust.
This could be a tragedy and, in my view, would prevent another beneficiary or family member from challenging a Will or trust that now benefits the family friend, business associate, or lawyer, even if the challenging beneficiary has probable cause. The person influencing the elderly person, therefore, shields himself or herself by influencing the person to include the no-contest clause.
My final general point is to make sure you know what documents your elderly parents have in place, and whether they are making changes, influenced by others, etc. Don’t end up with no options to challenge their situation where someone influences your parents to include him or her in the Will or trust, and also influences your parents to include a strong no-contest clause. This person may likely end up with your inheritance, unscathed.
One last comment for readers who wish to read the attached California court opinion. That is, the court opinion provides a great deal of discussion about this California sister case being a SLAPP case [“Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation”]. SLAPP is essentially a procedural speed-up option available for certain litigation cases, that I also find is an extremely interesting, evolving court development. I will write a blog post soon about what SLAPP is and why I find it a compelling and positive development in litigation. [California has a much broader range of SLAPP options compared to Georgia.]
The extent to which we all have to jump through more hoops in life has expanded substantially over the past 15 years or so. You can easily test this idea by trying to use a financial power of attorney document at a financial institution, or better yet try to deal with someone’s IRA account using a power of attorney. Or, what if your child has to be hospitalized while out of town without you? Try to deal expediently with the HIPAA medical confidentiality rules, etc.
This post includes a sample “John Doe” authorization document (referring to Georgia law) for minor children who might travel this summer (or stay with relatives or friends) without their parents immediately at hand. Click here for the sample pdf document. The hope, of course, is that no situations develop that require this document. But, taking a few minutes now to put the document in place could potentially help you and keep your away-from-home children from being caught in a snare (that you could have helped prevent).
The legal ethics rules require that I inform you that my blog is for marketing purposes and readers cannot rely on this blog post, nor on the pdf sample document, as legal advice from me or KaneTreadwell Law. I recommend strongly you consult a lawyer for assistance with this pdf document if you wish to put it in place for your particular situation.
Here also is one of my previous blog posts on planning for our age-18 and over children, especially those off at college. Click here.
Have a great summer.
I try persistently in all aspects of my life and lawyering to test and challenge my assumptions and ideas. Particularly in my law practice, I am open to self-criticism in order to expand my ideas and effectiveness as a lawyer. I know fairly accurately what I do well; I am more interested in learning and pondering what I do not do well, or what areas of change or improvement might work better for my clients, etc.
I spent years in the large law firm environment providing complex, trust-design planning for clients. I commented often at that time that putting clients in the most complex estate planning was easier than discerning more specifically what the particular client might not need. It was proper (and easier) in many cases to recommend for a wealthier client the broadest range of planning options, with much less need to stop, consider, and pick-and-choose, what might not be needed for the client. These are clients typically in the top 5-percent of net-worth, etc.
And for these wealthier clients, there were (and are) tax and non-tax benefits of placing those clients in the most complex planning available, including lifetime trusts, full GST (generation skipping planning, etc.), QTIP marital trusts, reverse QTIP trusts, defective grantor trusts, etc.
However, for the bulk of other clients not in the top 5-percent range, I now do not believe simply applying the all-complex approach is suitable. Furthermore, the more complex planning brings with it comparably more responsibility for the client to make sure he or she has named suitable advisors who will carry out the complex planning, including particularly the experience, skill, competency and trust of the named trustees, etc.
Bottom line, in all cases I do not recommend lifetime trusts for a client’s children when both parents die, unless there are specific circumstances that warrant the extended trust planning. What I recommend in many cases are lifetime trusts for the parents with thereafter an outright distribution to the children at age 30, but with the parents’ estate planning documents including — if later necessary — the power to make distributions in further (continuing) trust at the second parent’s death.
This later-trust feature provides an option to establish extended trusts for the children at that later time, if a child is under threat of divorce, lawsuit judgments, failed businesses, personal guarantee issues, etc. The key point is this trust decision can be made at that later time.
This later-trust feature also gives the children the responsibility of their own estate planning upon the death of their parents depending on the circumstances at that time. I, as a parent, believe that giving our children the power of independence and autonomy is a gift that goes well beyond a dollar valuation.
This simpler approach, however, of not using lifetime trusts for children does not eliminate a client’s need to review and consider the use of advisors and the naming of trustees. Some of us also have personalities that result in a “I can do it all myself” perspective that can cut against a more open mind to the selection and use of advisors / trustees.
Why, if I speak above about a simpler approach to estate planning, do I suggest the selection and use of advisors / trustees? The reason for each of us, whether later as a result of age-related disabilities or death, ultimately will not be able to “do it all” ourselves as to the functions where advisors / trustees can be significantly helpful. This ultimate need for assistance from others will arise regardless of the complexity, simplicity, or absence of our estate planning.
As to the selection of advisors, there are an abundance of individuals (attorneys, accountants, investment advisors) who, frankly, are not that good at their work. In my opinion, they are more focused on making the sale rather than on their services. There also are advisors, in my view, who are smart, but at the same time, to put it bluntly, stupid. These are not mutually exclusive terms.
And, although the question of trustee selection often centers on the naming of successor trustees who will step in later (if necessary), I strongly suggest that clients (e.g., parents) begin today developing relationships with both advisors and trustees. Begin observing now an ongoing demonstration of an advisor or trustee’s competence and trustworthiness.
Of immediate importance for this client advisor-review process are investment advisors and CPAs. Lawyer relationships are also important; but for most clients the hope is they will use a lawyer only sporadically. By contrast, the ongoing threat of investment losses and schemes (e.g., Madoff scams, elder financial abuse), in my view, can wreck a family. Having someone you trust to help oversee your investments is essential. CPAs are also crucial in helping to avoid costly, cumulative tax return and compliance problems.
Georgia’s newly enacted revisions to certain trust and estate law provisions bring Georgia up to speed with many other states with similar provisions. The changes are effective July 1, 2018. This is a good move for Georgia. Click here for a link to the legislative bill with the numerous changes.
As an important first aside, I will blog later on how these changes add even greater benefit to my favorite trust – the inter-vivos QTIP marital trust (created during the lifetime of the spouses). I also will provide other short blog posts from time to time with certain commentary about these law changes.
For today’s post, I include the following discussion about how long trusts can now last under Georgia law:
360-Year Trusts. The allowable duration for a trust changes from 90 years to 360 years. This is referred to under trust law as the “rule of perpetuities”, and applies generally as a duration limitation for non-charitable trusts. A trust can now operate for 360 years before the rule of perpetuities law mandates its termination.
However, as a practical matter, I do not think 360 years in and of itself is significant. But, now having a period longer than the previous 90-year limitation helps make sure a trust can run long enough to cover (at a minimum) the trust creator’s (settlor’s) grandchildren’s entire lives.
In other words, making sure the grandchildren get the asset protection benefit of the continuing trust for their entire lifetimes (rather than the trust having to terminate in 90 years, possibly before the deaths of the grandchildren; thus, the earlier termination removing the protective effect of the trust set-up for their benefit).
The reason I think the entire 360-year period is not significant is that the number of downstream descendants a settlor will have if his or her trust lasts 360 years will be geometrically expanded beyond anyone’s realistic ability to keep up with all the descendants. I have seen various projections indicating, on average for example, a person will have approximately 115,000 descendants in 350 years. This adds another level to the notion of “laughing heirs”.
The Delaware Tax Trap. This point relates to the new 360-year change. The Delaware Tax Trap is a complex part of trust tax law. It essentially triggers potentially punitive gift and GST tax results if a trust is changed where the duration of the trust is extended longer than the trust’s initial governing rule of perpetuities.
For example, assume I created an irrevocable trust in 1980 (when the law allowed a 90-year duration which means the trust essentially must end in 2070). Is this trust now subject to the Georgia 360-year rule? [There are some extensions to this 90-year period that get into the notion of “lives in being”; but I do not get into that point for this blog. You also can read one of my earlier blog posts on a creative potential use of the Delaware Tax Trap. Click here for my earlier post.]
Under this Delaware Tax Trap rule, the tax law provides that if I extend the duration of my existing 1980 trust beyond its then-applicable 90-year period, the result is that I am deemed for gift and GST tax purposes to have withdrawn the trust property and re-contributed the property to the extended-duration trust. In other words, I am treated as making a gift to the extended trust. This Delaware Tax Trap is a very esoteric tax law concept as a practical matter, but is an issue that most trust tax lawyers have many times grappled with (and debated) in great detail as part of their trust planning.
Below is my key comment for this blog post about Georgia and the Delaware Tax Trap.
The legislative act for these Georgia revisions to its trust and estate laws states “All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.” Does this mean the prior 90-year limitation disappears with no continuing effect for an existing trust?
I am merely raising the above question and have not yet fully examined the scope of an answer. Nor does a simple, quick answer jump out at me at this time. More broadly, the question becomes: “How best do trust lawyers deal with this new extended 360-year rule of perpetuities both for existing trusts and in creating new trusts?”
This 360-year rule of perpetuities question needs to be on every trust checklist.
This first paragraph is the essence of this post. One of my children is now 18 and an adult for HIPAA medical confidentiality and disclosure purposes. Without a HIPAA release, no educational institution, medical facility or other personnel of any type can disclose to me — even as a parent — information, including whether or not my child is a patient at any of the random medical facilities or hospitals I call. I could potentially be completely in the dark, and upended with worry if I were to run up against this HIPAA hurdle. Without the HIPAA release, my calling simply to ask any hospital if my child is a patient there will fall on deaf ears.
[There are some extremely limited exceptions to this HIPAA constraint, but as a practical matter we all should plan as though HIPAA applies to all health and medical information.]
Now, a more expanded discussion. My 18-year daughter leaves for out-of-state college in the fall. I will MISS her, but she — for which I am proud — is developing her own strong, competent, and independent wings. As part of her continuing pathway as an adult, I had my daughter recently sign core estate planning documents, including a basic Will, a financial power of attorney, and a health care directive. The health care directive was the primary impetus motivating me to get my daughter to sign these core documents.
In broader terms, I do not anticipate problems that will trigger having ro rely on these documents at my daughter’s youthful, healthy 18-year stage in life. But, I also am well aware of the vast, difficult hurdles and challenges I would face if something completely unanticipated were to occur and I did not have these documents. More specifically, the following HIPAA element was the tipping point as to my getting these documents in place for my daughter.
Let’s assume my daughter, at college 1,000 miles away, is admitted to a hospital due to illness or an accident (let’s hope these events never occur!). We don’t hear from her for a few days; her dorm roommates and other friends do not know her whereabouts; there have been no phone texts, no Instagram, etc. Let’s also assume we eventually learn my daughter has food poisoning to the extent she had to be hospitalized. But, where is she? No one will tell us.
However, my daughter has now designated my wife and me as agents under her health care directive. We have express authority from her for otherwise HIPAA- protected medical information. We can find out where she is much more readily and effectively, if ever necessary.
If you think this HIPAA worry is merely theoretical, then let me know if you change your mind after finding yourself in one of these worrisome, seemingly interminable, stonewall confidentiality situations. You can read a very good November 2017 WSJ piece on this same subject with reference to more examples. Click here for the WSJ link.
At a minimum, I suggest parents get a health care directive (that includes the HIPAA release) for their college-bound daughter or son before college starts. The fun college parties, beginning with fall football, start soon.
I will be glad to prepare these core documents, or you also can contact me at (470) 401-0101 if you have any questions or need additional information.